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REVIEW 
 
Thomas Dumm, Loneliness as a Way of Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2009), ISBN: 978-0674031135 
 
In the middle of the last century, American sociology became preoccupied with 
anxieties about loneliness.  The advent of the interstate highway system enabled 
Americans to be tucked away into bedroom communities dotting the landscapes 
around cities.  This suburbanization and its correlating increase in the atomization of 
the nuclear family precipitated much reflection on social isolation.  The early 1950s 
proliferation of studies on loneliness—e.g., David Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd, Paul 
Halmos’s Solitude and Privacy, and Margaret Mary Wood’s Paths of Loneliness—
appeared as reflections on these trends. 
 
This move was nearly coterminous with the advent of the concept of the nuclear 
family in the work of anthropologist George Peter Murdock.1  At this mid-century 
point, American sociologists regarded the nuclear family as a bulwark against the 
increasing threats of modernity.  For them, loneliness, or social isolation, was either 
one of those great threats to family or an unfortunate side effect of modern life 
against which family was a panacea. 
 
In Loneliness as a Way of Life, Thomas Dumm continues in this tradition of linking 
loneliness in America to the nuclear family.  From his readings of King Lear, Death of 
a Salesman (with Willy Loman comparisons to his own salesman father), Moby Dick, 
Paris, Texas, Ralph Waldo Emerson, W.E.B. DuBois, and personal anecdotes of his 
mother parenting nine children, his wife’s death, travels with his brother, his 
daughter leaving home, etc., family is at the core of his account of loneliness. 
 
Dumm is the chair of Political Science at Amherst College and author of earlier 
volumes of political theory, including Michael Foucault and the Politics of Freedom and 
A Politics of the Ordinary.  In this very personal exploration of loneliness, he shifts 
from more structural/systematic understandings of loneliness into more idiosyn-
cratic, subjective, and existential accounts.  In his frequent recourse to the first 
                                                 
1   George Peter Murdock, Social Structure (New York: Macmillan Co., 1949). 
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person plural, Dumm tries to create a collective experience of which his anecdotal 
use of his life and literary and filmic texts provide examples.  This practice increases 
as Dumm shifts between more analytic and more essayistic genres.  Over the arc of 
the book, he changes genre, style, and argument to move increasingly from an 
analysis of the collective social conditions giving rise to loneliness to the existential 
experience of it. 
 
This tension emerges at the level of defining the concept of loneliness.  On the one 
hand, he talks of loneliness as a domain of life, a ‛structural situation,‛ (25) or an 
effacing of public and private realms of life (29); on the other, he focuses primarily 
on individual experiences of the condition and how loneliness is mediated in 
particular lives.  He believes that ‚being present at the place of our absence is what it 
means to experience loneliness.‛ (16)  This experience is not alienation or anomie; it 
does not arise through negotiations of technology or capital.  While Dumm puts a 
social structural tint to it, his examples are about individual relationships.  He never 
reconciles the individualistic idiosyncratic propensities of the objects of his analyses 
with the broader, structural claims.  And more importantly, he demonstrates no 
method, no possible synecdochic or metonymic relationships between the 
fragmentary issues of individual experience and the nature of modern American life. 
 
He explores this experience through a prologue on King Lear and an epilogue on his 
personal experiences of writing on loneliness and four chapters ‚about how we are 
in the world (Being), how we attempt to hold the world (Having), how we desire 
(Loving), and how we suffer loss (Grieving).‛ (19)  In the first two sections—
‚Prologue: Cordelia’s Calculus‛ and the chapter ‚Being‛—Dumm bases his 
argument most explicitly on basic structures of modern life.  Over the arc of the 
subsequent chapters, he provides an increasingly subjective (and personal) account 
of loneliness.  Only in retrospect does it begin to appear that Dumm is working more 
in the tradition of American belles lettres—the essayistic lineage of Emerson, Thoreau, 
and DuBois—than in the vein of political theory.  This retrospective realization 
leaves some of the early chapters—especially ‛Being‛—  not integrating well with 
this more essayistic bent. 
 
In the prologue, Dumm uses King Lear’s family as the locus of his initial analysis of 
loneliness, but he is attentive to its concerns to broader questions of modernity. (13-
14, 15, 18)  Yet, his interpretation of the play emphasizes the missing mother—an 
absence that, he argues, permeates the entirety of the action, and thus implicitly 
introduces his argument that the sources of loneliness are in the family.  But 
Cordelia’s negotiation of this absence and her father’s demands for a public 
declaration of love create the conditions for eliciting Dumm’s conclusion that she is 
our first modern person—she relegates a thoughtful, rationalized sense of love to a 
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private sphere where it cannot have a role in the public affairs of state and 
succession.  By asserting that such sentiments belong within a private relationship, 
she not only affirms a modern public/private split, but also develops a sense of 
individual autonomy.  Yet in concluding this interpretation of King Lear, Dumm lays 
a foundation for his argument to slide from a structural analysis of modernity to one 
of the subjective experience of loneliness—he tells us that ‚Love is all we need to 
overcome absence—and loneliness is the absence we cannot overcome.  This is the 
present in which we live.‛ (15)  He shifts his discussion of loneliness from the 
structures of modern life into the domain in which Cordelia had just relegated her 
sentiments, the private internal workings of her family. 
 
Dumm briefly brings the discussion back to the level of modernity in his chapter on 
Being.  In this most complex and most difficult of the chapters, he paints a forlorn 
picture of modern life, in which the public/private distinction articulated by 
Cordelia becomes completely effaced. (29)  The feeling of loneliness, which most of 
the text relegates to the personal realm of the family, becomes political in this one 
chapter. ‚Loneliness thus may be thought of as being a profoundly political 
experience because it is instrumental in the shaping and exercise of power, the 
meaning of individuality, and the ways in which justice is to be comprehended and 
realized in the world.‛ (29) 
 
His political reading of loneliness draws somewhat peculiarly on Hannah Arendt’s 
The Origins of Totalitarianism, though her The Human Condition (which does receive a 
passing mention) would be a far more relevant text for an analysis of loneliness, 
especially since Dumm does not explain how a discussion of totalitarianism accounts 
for loneliness in American life.  He argues that loneliness is an implement of 
totalitarianism, fully extricating it from the familial realm; it (on Arendt’s account) 
comes from ‚a condition of being superfluous that grows out of uprootedness.‛ (39)  
To further explore this uprootedness, Dumm draws upon Arendt’s essay ‘We 
Refugees’ and uses the status of being a refugee as an analogy for the experience of 
loneliness. (44) But he does not make the argument that there is something inherent 
in modern life that resembles the condition of being a refugee.  This status is not a 
model of modern life; just the effects of being a refugee are similar to those of 
loneliness.  While he starts to place the problem of loneliness into a public realm, he 
pulls it back from being fully political; it falls back onto individual experience. 
 
In his chapter ‚Having‛ Dumm argues that capitalism is a symptom of the lonely 
self.  By interpreting it as a sign of, rather than cause of, loneliness, he establishes a 
framework in which loneliness arises through the personal negotiations of modern 
family life and not from a common experience of modernity.   In his readings of 
capital and consumption as symptoms, he briefly discusses the commodification of 
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the self, in which the self develops through self-possession: to be free is to be no 
longer beholden (to own oneself), i.e., to be alone (70), but his analysis here collapses 
being alone into loneliness. 
 
While Death of a Salesman may justify such a reading of one’s role in a family, he 
recasts Moby Dick as a tale of a sundered family. (85, 88)  As in much mid-century 
sociology, Dumm rests his sense of loneliness in family life.  As he shifts discussions 
to the locus of the family, his salesman father appears alongside the lonely Willy 
Loman.   Here we see the beginning, of what becomes a predominant motif in the 
latter half of the book, Dumm’s own family dynamics. 
 
As he moves into his chapter ‛Loving,‛ he places the discussion of loneliness 
entirely in the nuclear family, including his marriage and a discussion of his mother 
bringing up nine children.  In his reading of the Wim Wenders’ film Paris, Texas, he 
explores the nuclear family and its shifting boundaries of inclusion/exclusion and 
the forlornness of a man who cannot fully integrate into his natal one (with his 
brother) nor his conjugal one.  Their presence is insufficient to overcome an internal 
loneliness. 
 
In his chapter ‛Grieving‛ we find the lineage into which Dumm imagines Loneliness 
as a Way of Life falling, the essayistic tradition of American belles-lettres. His dis-
cussion of his wife’s death from cancer is approached through Emerson’s and 
DuBois’s own discussions of the deaths of their respective sons.  Here he asserts 
connections between ‛personal grief and the world at large,‛ (134) though he 
acknowledges that it is difficult to describe this connection.  But the possibly 
synecdochic or metonymic relationship is not fully explored.  Does he smuggle in 
some of Emerson’s transcendentalism to implicitly make this argument?  What does 
his grief for his lost wife tell us about loneliness in America?  He tries to answer 
some of these questions via recourse to Judith Butler’s ‛Violence, Mourning, 
Politics.‛  However, his appropriation relies on a reduction of grief as relational to 
grief as public.  While grief may arise from an ‛I‛ losing a ‛you,‛ that bond is not 
necessarily public; he effects that same effacement of the public/private split the 
collapse of which leads to loneliness.  Arendt’s effacing of the public/private split 
arises through a totalitarian elimination of the social space of the public.  But the 
grieving loss of Dumm’s space does not 1) preclude some other presence in the 
private, e.g., his children, and 2) does not occur in a place in which social space is 
publicly unavailable.  There remains the possibility of a retreat into a private space, 
e.g., the haven of a nuclear family. 
 
In his Epilogue, we learn that after returning home from a trip to Africa with his 
brother, the process of writing became a means to understand the loss of his wife 
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and to embrace loneliness as a solace for the pain.  One wants to like the text for its 
seeming honesty and openness, but still there is a sense that he has withheld as 
much as shown; the text reveals a discomfort with his own call for revelation.  There 
is a greater honesty to be found in his readings of narratives—Paris, Texas, Moby Dick 
and King Lear.  There is a tacit confession of a personal loss in these readings that is 
very honest.  As we learn how he understands these texts, we have a greater sense of 
Dumm than in the controlled revelations of his family life.  Lingering longer with 
the pathos of these characters and less with his own family would strengthen the 
book.  
 
His structural reading of loneliness as a condition of modern life is the least 
compelling, a weakness that makes the subjective readings of loneliness in Wenders, 
Melville and Shakespeare stronger by comparison.  And yet the effacement of the 
public/private, which in Arendt’s reading of totalitarianism is about the elimination 
of a public space for the social, becomes perpetuated by his making public of the 
private, a propensity increasingly common with social networking, ‘reality tv’, etc.  
Does the voluntary collapse of privacy produce loneliness?  Perhaps, more 
accurately, it arises from it.  However, we remain unclear about the status of this 
question and the experience of loneliness.  We are uncertain because we are left not 
knowing the status of the personal in a society in which the self is established 
through processes of consumption and in which public space is far too subordinate 
to the personal.  Dumm moves too much in this direction and thus fails to account 
fully for the presence of loneliness in American social life. 
 
Loneliness as a Way of Life is a text in which the indecision of genre undermines some 
compelling analyses, one in which the inability to articulate the means of switching 
from an individual loneliness to a problem of modern American life undercuts the 
sensitive readings of many texts. 
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